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Pandemic Revolutions, the Bewildered West, 
and the Friendly Autocrats
Editorial
While finalizing this issue of the IdPS, changes seem to 
happen in previously frozen regimes of the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA). Revolutions, protests, and civil 
wars are happening in more than fifteen countries. Will 
this wave of protests bring democracy, human rights, 
prosperity, and freedoms? We do not know yet. What 
we know is that this answer and the way it is addressed 
is of primary concern for the international stake-holders 
that wish to maintain and possibly foster their influence 
on the area.
The first half of 2011 has become the bloodier déjà vu 
of the events happening several years ago. It is a déjà 
vu with another difference: in 2011 pro-Western auto-
crats in MENA have been under popular attack. Popular 
uprisings and protests jubilantly dubbed revolutions 
hit their peak by replacing incumbents—sometimes 
through civil wars—in some countries and merely cre-
ating uproar in the others.
The peaceful Georgian Rose Revolution of 2003 man-
aged to overthrow Eduard Shevarnadze and install 
EU and NATO enthusiast Mikheil Saakashvili. Similarly 
peaceful Ukrainian Orange Revolution of 2004 has suc-
ceeded in replacing the official winner of the presiden-
tial elections Viktor Yanukovich with pro-western and 
apparently less pro-Russian Viktor Yushchenko. These 
were followed by the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, 
the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, less “revolutionary” 
Purple Revolution in Iraq, Blue Revolution in Kuwait and 
Green Revolution in Iran. Ironically, the Georgian presi-
dent has faced numerous protests himself; Yushchenko 
lost elections to previously ousted Yanukovich; the vic-
tor of the Kyrgyz revolution, Bakiyev, fled the country 
after another uprising, this time against him; and the 
Lebanese pro-democracy March 14 alliance is experi-
encing difficulties with the reform process.
 These “spillover revolutions” may not have had a lasting 
effect on the subsequent democratization of the coun-
tries but they did create a hopeful euphoria among 
western observers and politicians. EU and US officials 
did not spare praiseful words for the protesters and their 
leaders inter alia hoping to decrease Russia’s influence. 
Keeping with traditions, the 2011 events in Tunisia and 
Egypt have also been called revolutions, the Tunisian 
one getting jasmine as its flowery symbol. However, 
there are some substantial differences between the 
earlier colour revolutions and the ones of 2011.
Colours Gone Bloody
The self-immolation and death of a street vendor are 
believed to trigger the Tunisian uprising and to start 
a snow-ball process that affected the whole area. The 
Tunisian masses—initially without any visible leader-
ship—started protesting in the provincial town of Sidi 
Bouzid and spread over the country and most impor-
tantly to the capital Tunis. Violent clashes with police 
left at least 219 (as per UN) people dead. The president 
Ben Ali and his family fled to Saudi Arabia, while masses 
clashed with police, looted on the streets of Tunis, and 
torched the main train station. While members of the 
ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally (CDR), though 
not supported by protesters, quickly seized the pow-
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er, the pan-Islamic organization Hizb ut-Tahrir did not 
cease the opportunity to call for the formation of an 
ideal caliphate. Following the first chaotic days, the ad-
interim Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi, also a 
CDR member, reshuffled the government, removing all 
the figures connected to the former ruling party, as a 
consequence of the hard reaction of the protesters.
The protests against the government and the cases of 
self-immolation spilled over to Algeria, Syria, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Yemen, Mauritania, Iran and even the auto-
cratic Saudi Arabia, the safe haven of the ousted Ben Ali. 
The most anticipated and massive protests happened 
in Egypt, where protesters went out to streets after calls 
on social networking websites. The Egyptian uprising 
has not avoided casualties either and took longer to 
oust Mubarak, who skipping the speaker of the parlia-
ment handed the power over to the military. Yemenis 
Syrians, and Algerians (like Egyptians constrained by 
the state of emergency), also went out to the streets in 
mass protests against the government, although, so far, 
less successful.
Following the beginning of the civil war in March, Libya 
found itself split into two areas: Cyrenaica and part of 
the Fezzan under the provisional authority of the Na-
tional Transitional Council and Tripolitania turned into 
the loyalist stronghold of Muammar Gaddafi. After 
months of armed pressures, the long-deciding Western 
leaders backed by most of the Arab league members 
and of the Organization of the Islamic Conference man-
aged to break the impasse, seemingly paving the way 
to a fast collapse of the regime. 
Unlike most of the “original” colour revolutions, none of 
the current events result from rigged elections and were 
not initially supported by the West, which appeared 
quite abashed at the beginning. They have rather be-
come the culmination of the population’s accumulated 
anger with the policies of the everlasting incumbent. 
The same rage has been then successfully conveyed, 
backed, and driven by a number of opposition par-
ties, where “available”. Alternatively, as some media and 
pundits prefer to put it: the events are due to the natu-
ral strive of humans for democracy. In addition, unlike 
the “original” color revolutions, current events have not 
received wide media coverage until the first fatalities in 
Tunisia, the president of which was fairly supportive of 
EU and US policies. Due to the friendly policies towards 
the EU and the US and unfriendly policies towards the 
opposition (often represented by Islamic groups), pro-
tests against Ben Ali and Mubarak were unexpected 
by the West. Unlike the current events, which seem to 
topple West-friendly autocrats, Rose and Orange revo-
lutions were widely regarded as openly orchestrated by 
the West. On the other hand, openly anti-western re-
gimes like in the case of Syria prove far more successful 
in the repression of opposition revolts
(Table 1).
Country Democracy status (2011 
Freedom House) 
International 
stance
Type of protest The immediate outcome 
Tunisia Not Free Pro-western
Demonstrations 
with occasional 
hostilities
Regime change
Egypt Not Free Pro-western
Demonstrations 
with occasional 
hostilities
Regime change
Libya Not Free Anti-western
Civil war / External 
support
Possible regime collapse
Yemen Not Free Anti-western Civil disorders
Governmental changes / 
Status quo
Syria Not Free Anti-western Civil disorders
Governmental changes / 
Status quo
Table 1
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Premature Jubilation
The jubilation after the first colour revolutions has sub-
sequently proved to be premature. With virtually no 
improvements in democracy, the “brightest” and most 
eager student of the West in the South Caucasus on be-
half of president Saakashvili, worsened its democratic 
performance and went on suppressing critical media. 
Saakashvili faced a political crisis in 2007 and accusa-
tions in overusing power. His former revolutionary part-
ner Nino Burjanadze went into opposition. However, 
the US, hastily assuming that the planned bottom-
up democratization had taken place and civil society 
through its watchdog media is thriving, completed its 
media projects without any follow-up activities. The EU 
on the other hand rushed to reward Georgia and in-
cluded it in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
In addition, Armenia and Azerbaijan had not shown 
even a glimpse of improved democracy since the Euro-
pean Commission stated that concrete improvements 
would be needed by each South Caucasus countries to 
be included in the ENP. However, conveniently benefit-
ing from their inalienable regional status they also ap-
peared in the ENP.
The Ukrainian president Yushchenko did not keep up 
with Western hopes either. His relations with his revo-
lutionary colleague Yulia Tymoshenko became strained 
and less than a year after the Orange Revolution he dis-
missed her from the position of prime minister in favour 
of the former opponent Viktor Yanukovich. The US was 
disappointed in Yushchenko as bribery and cronyism 
bloomed during his presidency. Besides, his anti-Russian 
policies supported by the West received only embarrass-
ing 5% in the last presidential elections. The US bet on 
Yushchenko to reduce Russian influence over the East-
ern Europe and the Caucasus and it apparently lost. The 
EU on its part put its most enthusiastic admirer in the pile 
with worse performing countries and constantly delayed 
the longed association agreement. As a result, the newly 
elected president Yanukovich, who remarkably received 
the same percentage of votes this time in free elections, 
announced relations with Russia and the CIS a priority. 
Bakiyev, after-revolution president of Kyrgyzstan, did not 
become a US-supporter and allowed financial flow from 
and military bases of both the US and Russia. Though he 
was eventually overthrown, time was wasted. Though 
hard to believe the US and the EU have not done their 
homework of brief background check of their new de-
mocratizing neighbours. Alternatively, they preferred to 
ignore it hoping the wildcard might win.
Instead of developing grounded policies to help the 
local society build democracy and check on the new 
political elite, the US administration opted for “revolu-
tionizing” every possible corner of the world. Especially 
the ones that had oil like in the case of Iraqi legislative 
elections that were pompously called Purple Revolu-
tion. Similarly, the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon after 
the murder of Prime Minister Hariri was regarded by the 
US a token of its democracy promotion success. Maybe, 
this was true at the time, but that momentum is gone. 
Iraq is still struggling with its state building, and Leba-
non has just got a Hezbollah-backed prime minister.
Post-revolution
The protests against governments went pandemic 
in mid 2000s and were regarded as a panacea to the 
maladies of democracy. However, the panacea did 
not work even if it was partially injected by the ever-
hopeful American and European professionals. The risks 
of the side effects are even higher in the cases of the 
2011 uprisings that seem to mushroom in politically 
volatile regions without any additional western interfer-
ence. 2011 gives an opportunity for the EU and the US 
to restore its influence in MENA. The initially confused 
responses to the events in Tunisia and Egypt went in 
sharp contrast to the delighted reactions to the Rose 
and Orange Revolutions. There is a need to develop an 
approach that is neither blindly enthusiastic-turned-ig-
noring like in mid 2000s nor confused as in 2011. In ad-
dition, there is a need to understand that mass protests 
without a clearly defined and democratically agreed 
political and social agenda risk leaving the country in a 
revolutionary limbo.
The persistence and somewhat disbelief of Egyptians 
after Mubarak’s resignation shows that the transition 
of power from military should become the priority of 
US and EU talks with the Egyptian authorities, without 
striking another “friendly” but autocratic deal. After an 
initial confusion, both the EU and the US realized that 
the risk was to lose their influence on their previous al-
lied countries in MENA, while still facing the adversary 
regimes of Syria and Iran, where the opposition proved 
too weak or the repression too strong. The new strat-
egy of the West to support the prevailing opposition 
(even with military means as in the case of Libya) and to 
play a role in the following political developments does 
not grant the West the same influence that it had in the 
past, but may contribute to prevent the emergence of 
openly hostile regimes. On the other hand, it is clear 
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that the open (although belated) support for the rebels 
has positively influenced part of the Arab and North Af-
rican masses that—as in the case of Libya—wave the 
western flags instead of burning them as many Cassan-
dras predicted at the beginning of the Arab Spring.
Regardless the EU’s habit of retreating when deal-
ing with Russia, grouping Ukraine with its enormous 
membership aspirations and frontrunner position in 
comparison to the other ENP countries has not served 
well to the EU’s credibility. Thus, the promises should be 
kept otherwise the credibility will be lost. Alternatively, 
no unrealistic promises should be made. When dealing 
with the events in post-Soviet “colorants” Georgia and 
Ukraine, Russia’s superpower ambitions were ignored 
and that strategy backfired at the West by Russia’s more 
authoritarian and “backyard” approach to its neigh-
bours. The practitioner-favourite tool of “lessons learnt” 
should be put into practice and complemented by the 
one of “mistakes acknowledged”. Ignoring the potential 
influence of radical Islamists in these events and the 
possibility of their filling the power vacuum Tunisia and 
in Egypt, may substantially damage American and Eu-
ropean interests in the region. American and European 
strategists should not assume that mere presence of 
protests is a token of a developed and vibrant civil soci-
ety. However, instead of handpicking single individuals 
to elevate them to the power, they should contribute to 
the development of civil society, and assist institutions 
in organization of free and fair elections. Constructive 
involvement and interest in the country’s pressing is-
sues will also help to restore the positive image of the 
West, which is now marred with double standards and 
its autocratic cronies.
Most importantly the EU and the US finally need to fur-
ther coordinate their actions (both in peace and war) at 
least due to their varied influence in MENA countries. 
Cooperation rather than competition between the two 
on current matters has the potential of producing more 
effective strategies. Given that the American and Euro-
pean interests do not greatly diverge and cooperation 
is practically possible, combining the efforts would give 
them better opportunities to meet the challenges of 
power vacuum, radical Islamists and popular demands 
meanwhile serving their own economic and security 
interests together with the legitimate democratic aspi-
rations of MENA nations. 
